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INTRODUCTION 
We often speak as if the concept of knowledge plays a central role in normative appraisal.  
Whether you should tell someone that the bridge is safe to cross or treat the (apparent) 
fact that the stuff in the bottle is gin as a reason to serve it to a friend seems to depend 
upon what you know.  If you see the ropes snap and the bridge give way, you learn too 
late that you shouldn’t have told them it was safe to cross.  If you serve your friend petrol 
and tonic thinking the stuff in the bottle was gin, you will soon discover that you 
shouldn’t have served that drink.  As a rule, you might think, what you can properly treat 
as a reason for action or tell others depends upon what you know:  
KPR:  Whether it is proper to treat p as a reason for action 
depends upon whether you know p.1 
KA:  Whether it is proper to tell others that p depends 
upon whether you know p.2 
 From a certain theoretical perspective it’s hard to see how knowledge could play 
this role in normative appraisal.  Doesn’t justification play this role?  If it’s possible to 
justifiably believe what you don’t know, KA implies that you shouldn’t tell others what 
you rightly believe. KPR implies you that your justified beliefs are not the justified basis 
for action.  Many epistemologists balk at this.  They insist that justification, not 
knowledge, is the norm for practical reason and assertion:  
  JPR:  Whether it is proper to treat p as a reason for action  
   depends upon whether you justifiably believe p.3 
  JA:  Whether it is proper to tell others that p depends  
   upon whether you know p.4   
 Those who defend KA and KPR often complain that justification norms like JPR 
or JA are too weak to account for various intuitions.5  Among the cases thought to cause 
trouble for JPR and JA are cases of reasonably believed falsehoods.  If we assume that one 
of the orthodox accounts of justification is correct, JA and JPR imply that it can be 
proper to assert falsehoods and treat them as reasons for action.  You might be excused for 
telling others falsehoods or for acting on faulty intelligence, but it isn’t proper to do so.6 
                                                       
1 Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2005). 
2  Adler (2002), DeRose (2002), Slote (1979), Sutton (2005), Turri (2011), Unger 
(1975), and Williamson (2000). 
3 Fantl and McGrath (2009), Gerken (2011), Gibbons (2010), Littlejohn (2009, 2012), 
Locke (MS), and Neta (2009). 
4 Douven (2006), Kvanvig (2009), Lackey (2007), Littlejohn (2012), and Sutton (2005).  
5  In addition, those who defend knowledge norms (e.g., Williamson (2000) and 
Hawthorne (2004)) often criticize justification accounts for their failure to handle lottery 
cases and Moore’s Paradox.  See Kvanvig (2009), Littlejohn (2010), and McGlynn 
(Forthcoming) for a response.        
6 DeRose (2002), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and Williamson (2000) all maintain 
that false assertions are excused, not warranted.  Gerken (2011), Kvanvig (2009), and 
Lackey (2007) all argue that the appeal to excuses will not help to fend off the apparent 
counterexamples.  There is a tendency in the epistemology literature to think that the 
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Or, so say defenders of KPR and KA.  For their part, those who defend JPR and JA often 
say that cases of reasonably held false beliefs show that KA and KPR are too strong.  If 
you told them that it was safe to cross and they fell to their deaths, that might be 
regrettable, but you did nothing wrong in telling them that it was safe to cross.  Both sides 
think that cases of reasonably held false beliefs constitute counterexamples to their 
opponents’ views.   
 Which side is right?  Neither.   The right response to these cases is not to say that 
the justification accounts are too weak. The right response is not to say that these cases of 
reasonable false belief show that knowledge doesn’t play a central role in normative 
appraisal.  The right response is to reject those accounts of justification that imply that 
reasonably held false beliefs constitute counterexamples to KPR and KA. 
 In this paper, we shall focus on a specific kind of reasonably believed falsehood—
false normative propositions about what to do or what has moral value.  I shall argue that 
these cases do not threaten KPR.  What these cases show is that JPR as its ordinarily 
understood is indefensible.  In the next section, I shall offer two arguments for JPR and 
distinguish between two approaches to the epistemic norms.  I shall argue that reasonably 
held false beliefs often violate the epistemic norms that govern them and that this shows 
that a popular approach to epistemic normativity is misguided.  The take away point will 
be that while JPR is correct, KPR is not obviously incorrect.  
 
THE UNIFICATIONIST AND THE RATIONALIST 
There is a standard criticism of KPR in the literature.7  KPR says that it is improper to 
treat what you justifiably believe as a reason for action if your belief doesn’t constitute 
knowledge.  If, say, you believed that the stuff was gin and your belief was based on good 
evidence, many epistemologists would say that your belief about the contents of the 
bottle would be justified even if the stuff in the bottle were petrol.  Intuitively, it seems 
odd to say that your belief about the contents might be justified and then say that it 
would be improper to treat what you believe as a reason for action.8   
 There are two ways of fleshing out the intuitive worry.  First, consider two 
putative norms of theoretical reason:  
                                                                                                                                                            
paradigm case of an excuse is something like insanity or brain washing.  (See, for 
example, Audi (2001) and Wedgwood (2002).)  The thought seems to be that excuses 
exculpate by showing that the agent’s capacities for rational control have been 
undermined.  I think that this is a mistake.  Following Strawson (1965) and Gardner 
(2007), I think it’s important to distinguish excuses from exemptions or denials of 
responsibility.  In offering an exemption, you try to remove blame by showing that the 
agent’s capacities for rational control have been undermined.  In offering an excuse, you 
try to remove blame by showing that the agent’s rational capacities are intact.  We should 
reject the standard reason for rejecting the appeal to excuses.  I defend this view in my 
(2012).  The arguments in this paper lend further support to the idea that the rational or 
reasonable is not the mark of the right or the permissible.     
7 Brown (2008), Madison (2010), Neta (2009), and Littlejohn (2012) argue that Gettier 
cases cause trouble for KPR and KA.     
8 You can find versions of this criticism in Douven (2006), Fantl and McGrath (2009), 
Gerken (2011), Kvanvig (2009), Lackey (2007), Littlejohn (2012), Locke (MS), Neta 
(2009), and Smithies (2012).  
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JTR:  Whether it is proper to treat p as a reason for belief 
depends upon whether you justifiably believe p. 
KTR:  Whether it is proper to treat p as a reason for belief 
depends upon whether you know p. 
It seems that justification is closed under known entailment.  If you justifiably believe, 
say, that the stuff is gin and know that gin is not petrol, you should be able to justifiably 
infer that the stuff is not petrol.  If, however, it is possible to justifiably believe what you 
don’t know and you don’t know that the stuff is gin, KTR seems to imply that it is 
permissible to believe that the stuff is gin and impermissible to conclude that it’s not 
petrol even though you know that the stuff cannot be petrol if it’s not gin.  It seems that 
the right to believe, however, comes with further rights. Among these rights is the right 
to treat what you believe as a reason for belief.  If it didn’t come with this right, we’d be 
at a loss to explain why justification seems to be closed under known entailment.  Since it 
seems you shouldn’t say of someone that it was proper for her to believe p but improper 
to believe p’s obvious consequences on the basis of p, it seems JTR must be the norm of 
theoretical reason. 
 If JTR is the epistemic norm that governs theoretical reason, what should we say 
about the epistemic norms that govern practical reason?  Suppose that KPR rather than 
JPR governed practical reason. Theoretical reasoning aims to settle questions about what 
is true and comes to its conclusion when you form a belief.9 Practical reasoning aims to 
settle questions about what to do and comes to its conclusion when you form an 
intention or perform an action.  Suppose that you justifiably believed that the stuff was 
gin, but you were mistaken about that.  Suppose that you knew that you ought to serve 
the guests gin if you can.  In the case described, you could properly settle the question 
whether it is true that you should serve the guests gin by believing that you should and 
treating the (apparent) fact that the stuff was gin as a reason for so believing.  In the case 
described, you would be obliged to refrain from settling the question whether to serve the 
guests gin by treating the (apparent) fact that the stuff was gin as a reason for intending 
or acting.  This is why we cannot say that practical reasoning is governed by KPR rather 
than JPR.  From the epistemic point of view, whatever reason there is not to treat the 
(apparent) fact that p as a reason to φ is a reason not to treat the (apparent) fact that p as 
a reason to believe that you ought to φ. 
The argument for JPR rests on two plausible thoughts.  The first is that a 
common norm has to govern practical and theoretical reasoning.  (To say otherwise, you 
have to say that it would be improper to settle the question as to whether to φ even when 
you have properly settled the question as to whether you should φ.) The second is that a 
justification norm has to be the norm of theoretical reason.  (To say otherwise, you have 
to say that what justifies settling the question whether p by believing p does not justify 
settling the question whether q even when you know that q follows from p.)  If these 
points are both correct, then the Unity Thesis must be true: 
Unity Thesis: You cannot justifiably judge that you should φ 
unless you have justification to φ. 
 Let’s say that the unificationists accept the Unity Thesis.10 The unificationists 
think that the demands of practical and theoretical reason are unified in such a way that 
                                                       
9 Hieronymi (2005). 
10 Gibbons (2009, 2010), Littlejohn (2012), and Smithies (2012) defend the Unity 
Thesis.
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your overall obligation is never to act against your own justified judgment.  Much in the 
way that it seems that any reason that counts against acting would count against 
intending to act, the reasons that count against intending to act would count against 
judging that you should act.   
 The second argument for JPR is the rationalist’s argument.  The rationalists think 
that the mark of the right, the permissible, or the justified is the rational or the 
reasonable:  
Rationality Thesis: You have justification to φ if it would be 
rational for you to φ.11 
They object to KPR on the grounds that KPR assumes some sort of objectivist account 
of obligation.  An objectivist about obligation will say that your obligations can 
sometimes depend upon facts that you are non-culpably ignorant of or mistaken about 
and KPR commits you to such an account of obligation because it says that these sorts of 
facts can determine whether you are under any obligation to refrain from treating p as a 
reason for action.   
 If the Rationality Thesis is correct, the rational belief or the reasonable belief is 
the justified belief.  Were a rationally held belief of yours to be unjustified, you would be 
obliged to refrain from believing what you did.  As it would be reasonable to retain your 
belief, however, you would be permitted to retain your belief and so your belief would be 
justified.  Suppose that you justifiably believed that you should φ.  Your obligation could 
not be to do other than φ as doing so would be unreasonable.  Thus, the Rationality 
Thesis entails the Unity Thesis and JPR. 
 The Rationality Thesis entails the Unity Thesis, but the converse entailment does 
not hold.  The unificationist can, if she wishes, accept an objectivist account of epistemic 
obligation such as KPR.  Combined, KPR and the Unity Thesis entail that it’s only 
proper to believe what you know and that it’s impossible to justifiably believe what you 
don’t know.12 While the considerations that support the Unity Thesis support JPR, they 
don’t necessarily support the rejection of KPR 
 I suspect that many epistemologists are rationalists. If this is so, I expect that the 
rationalist’s argument would resonate with them.  Recall Cohen’s new evil demon 
objection to reliabilism: 
Imagine that unbeknown to us, our cognitive processes (e.g., 
perception, memory, inference) are not reliable owing to the 
machinations of the malevolent demon. It follows on a 
Reliabilist view that the beliefs generated by those processes 
are never justified. Is this a tenable result?  I maintain that it is 
not.13 
Anticipating that the reliabilists will say that these deceived subject’s beliefs are rationally 
held without being justified, Cohen says this response to his objection fails because 
‘justified’ and ‘rational’ are “virtual synonyms”.  Hos objection to reliabilism, he says:  
                                                       
11 Gibbons (2009, 2010) and Smithies (2012) defend the Rationality Thesis.  Although 
they don’t explicitly endorse it, you’ll see places where Audi (2001), Cohen (1984), Fantl 
and McGrath (2009), Huemer (2007), Kvanvig (2009), and Steup (1999) suggest that 
they take the rational or the reasonable to be the mark of the permissible.  
12 See Sutton (2005) and Unger (1975) for defenses of this view.  
13 Cohen (1984: 282). 
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hinges on viewing justification as a normative notion. 
Intuitively, if S’s belief is appropriate to the available 
evidence, he is not to be held responsible for circumstances 
beyond his ken.14   
To think that normative notions have to be understood in this way is just to endorse the 
rationalist view. 
 The rationalist rejects KPR because of its objectivism about obligation.  It doesn’t 
just reject objectivism about obligation in the epistemic domain, but in all domains.  
Recall from earlier the gin and tonic case.  If you think, as I do, that you shouldn’t 
poison your friends, you would say that the best you could hope for if you poison your 
friends is an excuse for you and a speedy recovery for your friends.  As a unificationist, I 
think that one of the advantages KPR has over its rivals is that it says that just as you 
shouldn’t poison your friends by serving them petrol, you shouldn’t treat the (apparent) 
fact that the stuff was gin as a reason for serving. It tells you not to act and it tells you not 
to form the beliefs that rationalize wrongdoing.  The rationalist rejects the idea that your 
obligation in this case is to refrain from poisoning your friend and would reject the 
suggestion that should accommodate the intuition that it’s wrong to poison by adopting 
an objectivist account of epistemic obligation.  In this passage, Fantl and McGrath 
explain why they you’ve acted rightly when you poison your friend in the gin and tonic 
case: 
… It is highly plausible that if two subjects have all the same 
very strong evidence for my glass contains gin, believe that 
proposition on the basis of this evidence, and then act on the 
belief in reaching to take a drink, those two subjects are 
equally justified in their actions and equally justified in 
treating what they each did as a reason, even if one of them, 
the unlucky one, has cleverly disguised petrol in his glass 
rather than gin.  Notice that if we asked the unlucky fellow 
why he did such a thing, he might reply with indignation: 
‘Well, it was the perfectly rational thing to do; I had every 
reason to think the glass contained gin; why in the world 
should I think that someone would be going around putting 
petrol in cocktail glasses!?’ Here the unlucky subject … is not 
providing an excuse for his action or treating what he did as a 
reason; he is defending it as the action that made the most 
sense for him to do … He is providing a justification, not an 
excuse.15 
As they see it, the mark of justified or the right action is what it makes sense to do and 
what it makes sense to do depends upon your evidence, not facts that are obscure to you.  
 Fantl and McGrath’s treatment of the gin and tonic case is in keeping with the 
rationalist view that the facts that determine an agent’s obligation (epistemic or moral) 
are limited to those facts that determine whether an agent’s attitudes or actions are 
reasonable or rational.  If, as I suspect, this rationalist view is largely responsible for the 
direction that the literature on epistemic norms has taken, then I think a careful 
                                                       
14 Cohen (1984: 282). 
15 Fantl and McGrath (2009: 125). 
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examination of this view is called for.  I shall argue that the view leads to a muddled 
understanding of obligation and responsibility.     
 
A RATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF OBLIGATION 
Because the rationalists reject objectivist accounts of obligation, they need a sensible 
subjectivist alternative.  They need a view on which the justification of action according 
to which the reasonable belief about what to do is a proper basis for action. For this 
reason, they have to deny that the facts that bear on what to do differ from those that 
determine whether our judgments are rationally held.  The most sophisticated 
subjectivist view of obligation is the prospectivist view.16  The prospectivist says that an 
agent’s obligation is to do what is prospectively best (i.e., what would maximize 
expectable value). The expectable value of an option is determined by the probability of 
its possible outcomes and the probable value associated with these outcomes.  An agent’s 
evidence determines the probability that an outcome will eventuate and the probable 
value associated with the various possible outcomes.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
I shall assume that the agent’s evaluative evidence is provided by her intuitions and 
beliefs.  This seems like the natural view for any prospectivist to adopt and it fits nicely 
with the rationalist idea that the facts that determine overall obligation are limited to 
those that determine what it would be reasonable for the agent to believe.17  
 The prospectivist view is similar to the view that agents ought to maximize 
expected value.18  These views agree two agents might be under different obligations if 
they have different empirical evidence.  The reason the rationalist should not characterize 
an agent’s obligations in terms of the notion of expected value is that expected value is a 
function of the objective value of an outcome.  Facts about value might be obscure to an 
agent. Her evaluative evidence determines what’s reasonable for her to think about value.  
Thus, the account that characterizes an agent’s obligations in terms of expected value 
would deny that there is a tight connection between the agent’s rational judgments about 
what to do and the agent’s obligations.   
 An example should help illustrate these points and explain why the prospectivist 
view is initially quite attractive. Some hedonists will say that death is bad for us (when it 
is) because it deprives us of something valuable, a future in which there is a greater 
                                                       
16 Zimmerman (2008). 
17 This seems like the natural view for the prospectivist.  Conee and Feldman (2004) and 
Wedgwood (2010) defend accounts of evidence in the spirit of this proposal.  The 
prospectivist account says that your overall obligation is to φ iff φ-ing is the prospectively 
best option.  If we ranked options in terms of the agent’s non-evaluative evidence and 
construed the agent’s evaluative evidence as consisting in independent facts about value 
(e.g., those believed or those known) we wouldn’t have the materials to rank the agent’s 
options in such a way that the agent would be under many (or any) obligations.  The 
agent would be permitted to fiddle while Rome burned if the agent wasn’t in cognitive 
contact with the right evaluative facts.  Moreover, the agent with a defective sense of 
what’s valuable could follow her (apparent) evidence scrupulously and end up with 
rational judgments about what to do that didn’t correspond to facts about what would be 
prospectively best.  So, the prospectivist needs a subjective approach to evidence in the 
prospectivist account of overall obligation.   
18 Jackson (1994). 
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balance of hedons to dolors.19  Some critics of hedonism say that death is bad for us 
(when it is) because it deprives us of something that we care about, a future in which 
there is a greater balance of hedons to dolors.20  These accounts don’t necessarily disagree 
about what makes some experience good for us. They disagree about the kinds of 
relations we have to bear to these possible future experiences for us to be deprived by 
losing out on them.  If entities that lack the capacity to care for their futures cannot be 
deprived when painlessly killed, then death might be bad for us even if it is not bad for 
an embryo.  There are cases in which it seems intuitive to say that the destruction of an 
embryo is not bad for the embryo and cases in which it does seem intuitive to say that 
allowing the embryo to develop into a creature that has the capacity to care about things 
is not good for the embryo.  The capacity to care condition is not without its intuitive 
support. Still, there are cases where it seems rather intuitive to say that the capacity to 
care is not required for a deprivation to be bad.  I expect that many readers will have 
some intuitions/evidence that supports views that incorporate the capacity to care 
condition and some intuitions/evidence that supports views that don’t.   
 If you had a boat, a flood, and three creatures trapped on the roofs of two barns, 
you would have to make a decision about what to do.  If you steer your boat to the first 
roof, you can save Doris. Edith and Elsie would parish. If you steer your boat to the 
second roof, you can save Edith and Elsie. Doris would parish. Doris and Edith are two 
equally healthy young women. Their futures would be equally good for them. Elsie is a 
cow.  Her future experiences would be uniformly positive, but she lacks the capacity to 
care about her future. What to do?   
 If the capacity to care condition is correct, the expected value of heading to the 
first barn is the same as the expected value of heading to the second.  If your evidence 
supported hedonism to some degree, however, the expectable value would differ.  
Intuitively, it seems that a perfectly good way to reason to a decision about what to do is 
to take account of the fact that you’re confidence is rationally divided between these two 
views.  It seems you can properly reason that since it would be just as good to go left as 
right whichever view of well-being is correct and better to save Edith and Elsie if the 
hedonist view is correct that you should save Edith and Elsie. A virtue of the prospectivist 
view is that it seems to be the one view on which good reasoning could take account of 
these facts.  If obligation is determined by expected value or objective value, such 
reasoning would transparently unsound.    
 There are two important points to bear in mind. The first is that the prospectivist 
view vindicates the kind of reasoning sketched above because it allows that the agent’s 
own uncertainty can partially determine the deontic status of the agent’s options. The 
second is that the rationalist needs to adopt something akin to the prospectivist view 
because they’ll want to say that the agent’s evaluative evidence plays the dual role of 
rationalizing judgments about what to do and determining what an agent’s obligations 
are. 
   
TWO APPROACHES TO EXCULPATION 
Mistakes and ignorance can exculpate. If you reasonably thought that the petrol in the 
bottle was gin, you could not be blamed for serving the stuff to your friend.  On 
objectivist accounts of obligation, it might be wrong to serve your friend the stuff, but 
                                                       
19 See Bradley (2009). 
20 Velleman (2000). 
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you can be excused for doing so if you were non-culpably ignorant of the fact that the 
stuff was poisonous.  The objectivist might treat all cases of non-culpable ignorance as 
being on par, but the objectivist is not committed to that.  Instead, they can (and should) 
say that when it comes to moral responsibility there is a difference between cases of 
evaluative and non-evaluative ignorance:  
The Asymmetry Thesis: Non-culpable factual mistake and 
ignorance will typically excuse the agent’s behavior, but non-
culpable evaluative mistaken and ignorance will typically not. 
On an attractive approach to moral responsibility, you’re responsible for wrongdoing 
when your actions manifest a certain kind of moral unresponsiveness.  Specifically, you 
can be blamed for de re moral unresponsiveness, a failure to show proper sensitivity to the 
concerns of morality. 21   This account, the quality of will account, explains the 
Asymmetry Thesis.  The fact that you poisoned your friend might initially seem to be 
evidence that you do not respond properly to the prospect of harming your friend. 
When, however, we learn that you are non-culpably ignorant of the fact that the stuff 
you served was poisoned, we can see that your actions do not manifest de re 
unresponsiveness. Your actions would display de re unresponsiveness if, say, morality 
cared about whether your friend suffered harm and your actions manifested an 
indifference or willingness to impose that harm.  Excuses do their work by undermining 
an inference from observations having to do with the objective nature of your deed or the 
consequences of your action to judgments about the quality of your will.22   
 Rationalists agree that factual mistakes and ignorance can exculpate, but they 
think that the objectivist model is wrong because it implies that facts that you’re non-
culpably ignorant of can determine what you’re obligation is.  On the rationalist view, if 
you act on reasonable but mistaken beliefs about the facts, you wouldn’t need an excuse 
if, say, you brought about bad consequences.  If you reasonably believed that the stuff in 
the bottle was gin, you did nothing wrong by serving your friend a Bernie (i.e., a petrol 
and tonic with lime on the rocks).  Ignorance and mistake exculpate by subverting 
obligation, not excusing wrongdoing.   
The trouble with the rationalist view is that it is incompatible with the 
Asymmetry Thesis.  To see this, we need to shift our focus to cases of normative 
ignorance and mistake.  The quality of will account says that factual ignorance and 
mistaken factual belief can exculpate by showing that the agent’s actions do not manifest 
de re moral unresponsiveness.  The account does not (typically) dish out excuses when 
agents act on mistaken normative beliefs or act from normative ignorance.  If the agent 
acts in full awareness of the facts and engages in wrongdoing, the agent’s behavior 
manifests a willingness to act against morality’s concerns. This, the quality of will 
account says, is precisely what we should blame agents for when they should be blamed 
for wrongdoing. We blame them for the failure to show proper sensitivity to morality’s 
concerns. 
 What should the rationalist say about normative ignorance and normative 
mistake?  From the epistemic point of view, mistakes are mistakes. The subject matter of 
a mistaken belief is not the sort of thing that determines whether a mistake is reasonable. 
Fit between the belief and the evidence is what determines whether a belief is reasonably 
held. Because the rationalist is committed to the view that moral beliefs are reasonably 
                                                       
21 For an articulation and defense of the view, see Arpaly (2003).  
22 Strawson (1962). 
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held if they fit the evidence (i.e., with the subject’s beliefs and intuitions), the rationalist 
cannot classify the actions rationalized by reasonable judgments about what to do as 
wrongs. Because of this, they cannot classify them as culpable wrongs.   
 The rationalists cannot say that we are culpable for engaging in wrongdoing if we 
are non-culpably ignorant of the facts or their moral significance.  As such, they have to 
reject the quality of will account and its suggestion that we’re to blame for de re moral 
unresponsiveness.  In denying that we’re to blame for failing to show proper sensitivity to 
morality’s concerns, the rationalists needn’t deny that we’re to blame for failing to show 
sensitivity to morality.  The rationalist might say that we’re to blame for failing to show 
due deference to morality as a source of authoritative or overriding reasons when, say, we 
decide to pursue our own interests or the interests of those near and dear to us rather 
than meet our moral obligations. In other words, they might say that we’re to blame if 
our actions display de dicto moral unresponsiveness, a willingness to do what we take 
ourselves to be duty bound not to do. On this account, we might also be responsible for 
doing what we should have thought we’d be obliged to do.  The important point is that 
this view implies that non-culpable factual and normative ignorance and mistake 
exculpate.  
The rationalist’s view doesn’t just excuse the inexcusable; it justifies it. Don is 
your typical television father from the late 50s or early 60s.  He loves his children and 
does what he can to try to keep them happy.  He puts money away for his son to go to 
school. He puts money away for a sailboat for his daughter.  Although his daughter has 
said repeatedly that she wants to go to school, he sees no reason to help her because he 
sees no reason for women to go to college.  Intuitively, he should have put money away 
for his daughter’s education. He should have done so even though there was nothing in 
Don’s evidence that would rationally support his belief that he ought to support his 
daughter’s ambitions in the same way he supports his son’s ambitions.   
Not only did Don fail in his responsibilities as a father, he is responsible for this 
failing.  He knew that both of his children wanted to go to college and he knew that he 
could provide for both of them.  He was fully aware of the reasons that there were to save 
for his daughter’s education.  True, he didn’t see these reasons as reasons, but this is why 
we think that he is sexist, not why we should excuse him.    
 Because Don shouldn’t act like a sexist and his sexism isn’t an excuse for his 
actions, he’s culpable for his wrongful behavior.  The rationalist doesn’t have the 
resources to deliver the right verdict about Don’s responsibilities or Don’s responsibility 
for failing to meet them.  Plausibly, the reason that the otherwise virtuous Don didn’t do 
what we now think we should for our children is that Don lacked the evidence he needed 
to rationally settle the question as to whether to save for his daughter’s education in the 
way that he should have.  If the rationalists want to deny this, they have to say that Don’s 
judgments about what to do are somehow less than fully rational. The rationality of these 
judgments, however, depends upon how he responded to the evidence he had, which we 
take to be the intuitions and beliefs that he had. There is no good route of reasoning that 
would take him from those beliefs and intuitions to the judgment that he should treat his 
children the way that we think he should. 
 The case shows that the rational or reasonable is not the mark of the right, the 
justified, or the permissible. If it were, Don wouldn’t be culpable for wrongdoing as there 
would be no wrongful act that he might then be blamed for.  What would be rational for 
the morally conscientious agent to believe is determined by the agent’s evaluative 
evidence and empirical evidence. If the rationalist view is correct, the same facts 
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determine what’s reasonable to do and what’s permissible to do.  We know that the 
rationalist view isn’t correct because we know that the facts that determine what’s 
rational for Don to believe don’t determine what Don is permitted to do.  Even if we 
were to say that there is no real gap between the rational and the justified in the case of 
factual ignorance or mistake, there is a yawning gap between the two in cases of 
normative ignorance and mistake.   
 If the objection is sound, what does it show?  For one, it shows that the 
rationalist’s view is unsound.  It shows that you cannot argue from rationalist 
assumptions against KPR or appeal to rationalist assumptions in offering an account of 
justified belief.  For another, it shows that if the unificationist argument is sound, JPR 
requires us to reject all orthodox accounts of justification.  All the orthodox accounts say 
that justification is non-factive.  JPR says that justified beliefs are the proper basis for 
action.  If you justifiably but falsely believed, say, that putting money aside for a sailboat 
was the thing to do, it wouldn’t be something you should do and it would be something 
you’d have the right to do.  So, arguing from unificationist assumptions, we should be 
able to show that the orthodox accounts of justification are wrong.  Your normative 
beliefs might fit the evidence, they might be formed reliably, they might cohere, etc., but 
they wouldn’t be justified if they didn’t fit the normative facts.23   
 
A RATIONALIST RESPONSE  
The rationalist has to reject the Asymmetry Thesis. The rationality of normative beliefs 
don’t depend upon whether they (or the beliefs they’re based upon) accurately represent 
the values that determine what the agent’s obligations are. Since the rationalist takes the 
rational judgment about what to do to be a justified basis for action, the most the 
rationalist can say about the actions the agent performs on the basis of a rational 
judgment is that it is regrettable. The rationalist cannot say that there’s any wrong to 
excuse, and so she must reject the Asymmetry Thesis and the quality of will account. 
Whatever it is that renders us blameworthy for the things that we do, it’s not mere de re 
moral unresponsiveness.  If it’s not wrong to display such insensitivity, it’s not culpably 
wrong to do so.  Since this seems to be intuitively wrong, so much the worse for the 
rationalist view. 
 This, in brief, is the anti-rationalist argument.  What can the rationalists say in 
response?  I think the only thing that the rationalist can do is reject the Asymmetry 
Thesis.  In this section, I shall argue that if the rationalist does this, the rationalist faces 
some serious problems. By rejecting the Asymmetry Thesis, the rationalist view leads to a 
skeptical view about moral responsibility. 
 Suppose you serve your friend a Bernie and the drink nearly kills her.  Plausibly, 
you cannot be blamed for the poisoning if you were non-culpably ignorant of the fact 
that the stuff you served was poisonous.  Everyone should agree to that. The rationalist 
might then say that this reflects an important point about culpability and ignorance:  
                                                       
23 The argument isn’t intended to show that all beliefs must be true to be justified, only that an 
important class of beliefs cannot be justified if false. Since orthodox accounts of justification say 
otherwise, Don’s belief about what to do for his daughter is a perfectly good counterexample to 
all the familiar accounts of justification that allow for false, justified beliefs (e.g., reliabilism, 
evidentialism, phenomenal conservatism, proper-functionalism, etc.).    
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The Culpability Thesis: If you are ever culpable for acting in 
ignorance, you have to be culpable for the ignorance in which 
you act. 24   
The rationalist can appeal to the Culpability Thesis to try to explain why we should 
reject the Asymmetry Thesis.  Just as you cannot be culpable for poisoning your friend if 
you were non-culpably ignorant of the fact that the stuff you served was poisonous, Don 
cannot be culpable for his wrongdoing if he’s non-culpably ignorant of the reasons for 
treating his daughter differently.  By hypothesis, Don has responded to his evidence 
responsibly and rationally, so he cannot be culpable for his failure to believe that he 
ought to treat his daughter differently. 
 The rationalist’s only line of response is to appeal to the Culpability Thesis to try 
to undercut the Asymmetry Thesis. Unfortunately, the Culpability Thesis leads rather 
quickly to widespread skepticism about responsibility.  This is because the Culpability 
Thesis entails the Origination Thesis:  
The Origination Thesis: Culpable wrongdoing can be traced 
back to a case of clear-eyed akrasia (i.e., a case in which the 
agent acts in the belief that the relevant action is wrong).  
According to the Culpability Thesis, Don can’t be culpable for his wrongful behavior if 
he doesn’t believe it to be wrong unless he’s culpable for his ignorance.  What would it 
take for him to be culpable for his ignorance?  The rationalist cannot say he’s culpable for 
his ignorance simply because his ignorance manifests, say, his sexism.  To be culpable for 
his ignorance, he has to be culpable for the way he’s managed his opinion.  And, as 
Rosen notes, to be culpable for the failure to believe, Don must be culpable for failing to 
take the appropriate steps in forming his beliefs.  To be culpable for that, however, there 
must be something that he’s done or that he’s left undone that he’s culpable for that’s 
responsible for his ignorance (i.e., his failure to form a true belief about the relevant 
normative matter).  What could that be?  It could not be further ignorant behavior on his 
part.  If it were, the argument would apply again. Thus, once the rationalist endorses the 
Culpability Thesis, the rationalist has to endorse the Origination Thesis. 
 When combined with the plausible premise that we rarely act in the belief that 
our obligation is to do otherwise, the Origination Thesis leads to an implausible form of 
skepticism about moral responsibility.  Since the rationalist is committed to the 
Culpability Thesis, they can try to show that these theses are independently plausible and 
that the consequences aren’t quite so bad as they might first appear.  In this section, I will 
argue for two points. The first is that the arguments offered in support of the Culpability 
Thesis aren’t persuasive. The second is that the rationalist view actually undermines the 
quite modest thesis that you must endorse if you think anyone is ever responsible for 
anything:  
The Trivial Culpability Thesis: If an agent knowingly engages 
in wrongdoing and is not under duress, the agent is culpable 
for his wrongful behavior.   
 Rosen recognizes that the implications of the Culpability Thesis might seem 
prima facie implausible, but thinks that it is independently plausible:    
                                                       
24 It also seems that the rationalist is committed to the Culpability Thesis.  If you reject the 
Asymmetry Thesis and believe that non-culpable factual ignorance exculpates, you have to 
believe that non-culpable evaluative ignorance exculpates.  If you didn’t, you would reject the 
Asymmetry Thesis.   
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When we engage the examples [of moral ignorance and 
mistake] in imagination, bearing it fully in mind that the 
agent is not responsible for his moral ignorance, then our 
capacity to blame is neutralized by this very 
thought.  Moreover, this is not simply a psychological 
observation.  When we find ourselves unwilling to blame the 
agent who acts from blameless ignorance, it is because we 
have come to think that it would be a mistake to blame 
him.25  
If you press Rosen to explain why non-culpable ignorance exculpates, he says that it 
would unfair to blame someone for his action if the agent lacks the general capacity to 
appreciate and to act on moral reasons there are to do otherwise. Extending this point, he 
says:  
Just as it is unfair to blame someone for doing what he is in 
fact entitled to do, it is unfair to blame someone for doing 
what, through no fault of his own, he takes himself to be 
entitled to do.  Take [Don] at the point at which he has 
formed the view that it is perfectly all right for him to deny 
his daughters certain opportunities.  So far, by hypothesis, 
he is blameless. Now he does it. How can you blame him? 
How can you expect him to do otherwise given what he 
blamelessly believes? 26 
Rosen is hardly alone in thinking this. Even some of his critics agree that the crucial 
question to ask about Don is whether he could be reasonably (and hence fairly) expected 
to do something to remedy his ignorance.27 If we assume that Don displays a sufficient 
degree of concern about meeting morality’s demands (whatever they are) and 
scrupulously fits his beliefs to the evidence, there are no steps they could have reasonably 
taken to remedy their ignorance.  Rosen thinks that this should be exculpatory.  
 Zimmerman offers a different defense of the Culpability Thesis, one that has to 
do with control.  We’ve seen already that you cannot be held responsible for acting out of 
factual ignorance unless you are culpable for the ignorance in which you act, but what 
about moral ignorance?  Zimmerman thinks that you cannot be culpable for something 
unless you’re in control of that thing and that you cannot be directly culpable for 
something unless you’re directly in control of that thing.  We aren’t directly in control 
over whether we’re ignorant. If we’re ever to remedy our ignorance, we have to do so by 
means of something else we have control over (e.g., considering a thought experiment, 
asking a guru, running though an argument, etc.).  If this is right and we’re never directly 
in control over whether we act from ignorance, we’re never directly responsible for acting 
from ignorance whether the ignorance has to do with matters of morality or matters of 
fact.28    
  
                                                       
25 Rosen (2003: 71). 
26 Rosen (2003: 74). 
27 See FitzPatrick (2008) and Levy (2011). Levy is right that FitzPatrick is too optimistic 
in thinking that our baddies could have taken steps to discover the moral truth. Both are 
mistaken in thinking that it matters whether they were. 
28 Zimmerman (2002, 2008) offers this defense of the Culpability Thesis. 
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 Neither defense is compelling. Rosen’s argument shouldn’t persuade anyone who 
doesn’t already reject the quality of will account.  Whether you’re culpable for your 
ignorance (i.e., for your lack of belief) depends upon whether your ignorance shows that 
you are properly concerned with the values that matter to epistemic assessment (i.e., the 
pursuit of truth and avoidance of error).  In keeping with the quality of will account, you 
are not culpable for your error if you are properly sensitive to that which has epistemic 
value (i.e., if you follow your evidence).  However, whether you are culpable for your 
action depends upon whether your actions show that you have proper concern for the 
values that matter to moral assessment.  The person of reasonable prudence can form 
beliefs that show that she is properly responsive to epistemic reasons even if her actions 
manifest de re moral unresponsiveness.  If that’s so, there’s no reason to think that Don 
cannot be culpable for his sexist behavior simply because he’s not culpable for failing to 
form the belief that he should have done otherwise.   
Zimmerman’s argument for the Culpability Thesis assumes that what you’re 
directly responsible for is limited to what you have direct control over. This is also a 
mistake.  To say that you are directly responsible for something is to say that you are 
responsible for it and that your responsibility does not derive from your responsibility for 
something else.  Those who accept the quality of will account will say that the reason that 
you are culpable for wrongdoing when you are is that you are not properly sensitive to 
the interests morality wants us to protect.  The question as to whether you can directly 
remedy the defects in your will is neither here nor there.   
 It doesn’t seem to me that those who accept the Culpability Thesis have offered 
an adequate defense of it.  If the Culpability Thesis is unmotivated, the rationalist hasn’t 
given us any good reason to reject the Asymmetry Thesis.  Someone might succeed where 
others have failed, so let’s suppose that the Culpability Thesis is correct and see whether 
we can live with its consequences.  Some of us would say that the skeptical consequences 
of the Origination Thesis are bad enough and reject the rationalist view on the grounds 
that it implies that the locus of original responsibility cannot be anything but a case of 
clear-eyed akrasia. As bad as this is, I think the rationalist’s predicament is actually much 
worse than this. I don’t think the rationalist can make sense of how somebody could be 
culpable even in these cases. 
 If the rationalist is committed to the Culpability Thesis, she needs an account of 
culpability that accommodates it.  It seems that two options are available to her.  First, 
she might say is that we’re culpable for wrongdoing when we act in the belief that we’re 
doing wrong.  The action is culpable because it shows that the agent doesn’t show due 
respect for morality as a source of reasons. Second, she might say that we’re culpable for 
wrongdoing when we act in the correct belief that we’re doing wrong. The action is 
culpable because it shows that the agent doesn’t show due deference to morality and 
shows that the agent’s concerns aren’t morality’s concerns.  Neither approach is at all 
plausible.    
 Let’s consider the first approach first.  It has a number of objectionable features.  
First, the thesis that we can be blamed for failing to show due deference to morality is 
subject to counterexamples involving inverse akrasia.29  When Huck Finn helped Jim 
escape, he did so in the belief that what he did was wrong.  He thought that it was 
morally wrong to help runaway slaves. If we are culpable for the failure to show due 
deference, we would have to say that Huck was culpable. To show due deference to 
                                                       
29 See Arpaly (2002).   
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morality, you have to respond to morality's apparent demands by treating them as 
authoritative. Acting against your conscience would be a failure to show due deference 
and while Huck did that, he was praiseworthy for it.   
Second, since the view assumes that you are not directly responsible for the 
failure to show proper sensitivity to morality’s concerns, we have to ask why we would be 
responsible for the failure to show due deference to morality if there is no specific 
concern of morality that we can be held responsible for being insensitive to.  The answer 
must be that morality has a kind of rational authority by virtue of which failures of due 
deference are inculpating in a way that the failure to show sensitivity to moral reasons 
wouldn’t be.  This generates an explanatory worry.  I cannot see any reason to think that 
there would be an explanation of the rational authority of morality that would explain 
why failure to show due deference is inculpating if insensitivity is never itself inculpating 
on its own.  If morality’s reasons don’t have rational authority, why would morality? 
Third, it is not clear that the rationalist is entitled to the assumption that 
morality has the rational authority it must for a failure of due deference to be a locus of 
original responsibility.  Consider the legal case. The law aims to protect a number of 
interests. An agent that threatens those interests might do so because she is ignorant or 
mistaken about the facts. In such cases, it seems inappropriate to punish because the 
agent has not shown herself to be willing to injure any of the interests that the law aims 
to protect.  On this point, the rationalists and the rest of us can agree. What about cases 
of impossible attempts in which the agent tries to perform an action she believes 
mistakenly to be illegal? Does such a mistake of law inculpate? No, it seems not. As with 
the case of mistake of fact where an agent unwittingly threatens a legally protected 
interest without showing that she is willing to harm this interest, the agent who attempts 
to do what she falsely believes to be illegal has not shown herself to be willing to injure 
any of the interests that the law protects.  This assumes, of course, that the law’s interests 
do not include an interest in having citizens show due deference to the law. The law can 
properly protect us from those who would deprive us of property or exploit children, but 
not protect us from those who are willing to break a law in circumstances where no 
further legally protected interest is at stake.  If it did otherwise and its list of protected 
interests included deference to the institution of law itself, I think we would have little 
respect for the institution.  It would be willing to punish agents who were unwilling to 
threaten any of its other interests simply when such agents followed all of its regulations 
for the simple failure to respect authority as such.  That seems outrageous. 
An institution that would punish or sanction someone who fails to respect its 
authority without having failed to show proper regard for the interests that the authority 
is dedicated to protecting is defective. Its sanctions and punishments would be the empty 
exercise of authority and it would not deserve the kind of respect that moral rationalists 
have claimed morality deserves. It would be an empty exercise of authority for morality 
to sanction you for the failure to show due deference when morality acknowledges that 
you showed proper sensitivity.  Just as a just system of laws will not regard mistake of law 
as inculpating, a just moral framework will not take failure to show due deference to be 
the locus of original responsibility.  
At this point, the rationalist might agree that acting against your own moral 
judgments is not inculpating unless your judgment is correct.  This would allow the 
rationalist to avoid the three problems just discussed, but it doesn’t save the rationalist 
view.  We can see why if we think about a concrete case. The rationalist view says that 
rational judgments about what to do can justify acting in line with those judgments. The 
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rationality of these judgments depends upon an agent’s evaluative evidence (i.e., her 
intuitions and beliefs). With this picture before us, it seems to me that the following is a 
plausible conjecture: with a handful of exceptions there is for each reading assigned in 
your standard course on contemporary moral problems a possible configuration of 
mental states such that a subject could rationally believe the conclusion of that piece for 
roughly the reasons set out in that piece.  The rationality of the moral judgments will 
depend upon whether there is some sound deliberative route that takes you from the 
evaluative evidence to the relevant conclusion about responsibilities.  (Remember that we 
typically can only undo the work that should be undone by changing the evidence, not 
simply by pointing out that the reasoning that led to the conclusion was faulty.  We do 
not typically take these authors to be less than fully reasonable for failing to dream up the 
intuition pumps that later authors devise to frustrate their efforts.)   
With this conjecture in mind, consider Aquinas’ claim that essentially non-
procreative sex is morally defective.  He might have thought that if such sex were 
required for the preservation of the species or for shutting down the Doomsday device, it 
would be acceptable, but his arguments seem to require him to believe that it would be 
wrong for two men to have sex with each other because they had finished a bottle of wine 
and their cable was on the fritz.  We might imagine that Adam and Stephen shared 
Aquinas’ intuitions and relevant beliefs, so there was no sound deliberative route that 
would take them to the conclusion that it would be acceptable for them to do what they 
were about to do. The judgment that we really shouldn’t do this has never kept us in our 
clothes.  You know how this ends.     
What should we say about Adam and Stephen?  What we should say is that their 
actions were not for the prospectively best.  Given their evaluative evidence, abstaining 
ranks higher than indulging.  The rationalists have to say that if any action is ever 
impermissible, their lusty romp was impermissible.  We should not, however, say that 
their actions were impermissible.  The view delivers the wrong deontic verdict about the 
case, but that’s not my concern here.  My concern has to do with culpability?  Should we 
say that Adam and Stephen are culpable for acting when they acted in the belief that 
what they were doing was wrong?   
Remember that their belief is a reasonable one.  It is the belief that they formed 
by following the evidence they had. Adam and Stephen believe that they have done 
wrong on the basis of evidence.  This evidence, the rationalist says, justifies their beliefs 
and ensures that their beliefs are correct.  So, the rationalist doesn’t just think that this is 
another case of clear-eyed akrasia, but also a case in which the agents knowingly do 
wrong.  If they knowingly do wrong, the Trivial Culpability Thesis says that this is a case 
where Adam and Stephen are culpable.  The rationalist faces a dilemma.  If the rationalist 
thinks that we shouldn’t blame Adam and Stephen, they must reject the Trivial 
Culpability Thesis. If the rationalist endorses the Trivial Culpability Thesis, then they 
have to blame Adam and Stephen and say that their ignorance is inculpating.  
 The problem with the first horn of the dilemma is obvious.  If you can’t blame 
someone for knowingly doing wrong when he’s not under duress, it doesn’t seem you 
can blame anyone for anything.  So, rejecting the Trivial Culpability Thesis pushes us 
towards total skepticism concerning moral responsibility. If, on the other hand, the 
rationalist thinks we should blame Adam and Stephen, then the rationalist has to think 
that there’s some sense in which Adam and Stephen have acted badly.  I suppose that 
most rationalists would grasp this second horn of the dilemma. 
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 If the rationalist grasps the second horn of the dilemma, they have to say that 
Adam and Stephen have acted badly. In what sense have they done that?  The rationalist 
cannot say that they acted badly simply because they failed to show due deference to 
morality.  This would be to revert back to the view of responsibility we’ve just rejected. If 
we blame Adam and Stephen for the failure to show due deference in a case where we 
know they haven’t failed to show proper sensitivity to any of morality’s concerns, it 
would be fetishistic of us to desire that they not act badly in the relevant sense.  We 
would express the desire that agents show due deference to morality on those very 
occasions where we judge that the agents were sensitive to morality’s concerns.  We 
should no better than to blame those we know have been sensitive to morality’s concerns.  
Thus, it seems that the rationalist would have to say that Adam and Stephen have acted 
badly (in part) because they’ve shown de re moral unresponsiveness.  But, by our lights, 
Adam and Stephen haven’t failed to show proper sensitivity to morality’s interests. 
 Because the rationalist has to reject even the Trivial Culpability Thesis, the 
rationalist cannot avoid wholesale skepticism about moral responsibility.  When I said 
earlier that that the rationalist view offers a muddled account of moral responsibility, this 
is the muddle I had in mind.    
  
CONCLUSION 
Let me briefly recap.  The rationalist rejects KPR on the grounds that it is committed to 
an objectivist account of obligation.  If, as the rationalist claims, it’s proper to treat 
reasonable beliefs as reasons for action, this must be true of reasonably held normative 
beliefs.  Because the rationalist thinks that any reasonably held normative judgment is a 
justified basis for action, the rationalist view implies that normative ignorance subverts 
obligation and that it exculpates.  Moreover, they’re faced with the unpalatable choice 
between a view on which normative ignorance inculpates and wholesale moral 
skepticism. 
 The rationalist view was that there were epistemic constraints on practical 
normativity.  The rationalist can defend the Unity Thesis on the grounds that these 
constraints would rule out any case in which an agent’s obligation is to act against her 
own proper judgment about what to do.  This gets things backwards.  There are practical 
constraints on epistemic normativity and this is why the requirements of practical and 
theoretical reason are unified.  As Hume never said, the standards of theoretical reason 
are, and ought to be, the standards that determine whether you meet independently 
determined standards of practical reason.  They cannot pretend to any other office. 
 What does this all tell us about justification and epistemic norms?  Recall from 
earlier the unificationist argument for JPR.  It starts from the idea that the justified belief 
is, inter alia, the justified basis for action.  To justifiably believe p, you must have the 
right to treat p as a reason when trying to settle questions about what’s true and what to 
do.  If that’s so, the anti-rationalist argument shows that the justification of at least some 
beliefs (e.g., evaluative beliefs) depend upon whether they fit the facts, not just upon 
whether they fit the evidence.  If the unificationist argument for JPR sketched above was 
sound, the upshot is not that we can use some orthodox conception of justification to tell 
us what it takes to conform to the norms governing belief.  The upshot is that there’s 
little that distinguishes justification from knowledge.   
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